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To Support a “Brother in Christ”:
Evangelical Groups and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations during the Ríos Montt Regime 1
On March 23, 1982, a group of young officers in the Guatemalan army staged a coup
d’état at the National Palace in Guatemala City. After ordering the president, General Romeo
Lucas García, to step down, the young officers announced their intention to replace him with a
temporary military junta that would rule until Guatemala could hold free elections for a new
president. 2 The officers named Brigadier General José Efraín Ríos Montt, General Horacio
Maldonado Schaad, and Colonel Luis Gordillo Martínez as the leaders of the junta. 3 Not on
active duty at the time of the coup, Ríos Montt learned of the decision from a radio broadcast
calling him to the National Palace while he prepared for student-teacher meetings in his role as
academic director at el Verbo (“The Church of the Word”) Christian day school. 4 Prior to
accepting the army’s call, Ríos Montt asked for guidance from the elders of el Verbo, a neoPentecostal church that missionaries from the Eureka, California-based Gospel Outreach Church
had founded in 1976 and continued to direct.
In an interview four days after the coup, U.S. missionary and el Verbo governing church
elder Carlos Ramírez told reporters that following the young officers’ call, he and the other

This essay began as a paper for the 2013 SHAFR conference. It benefited from comments from panel members
Seth Jacobs, Andrew Preston, Melani McAlister, and Benjamin Brandenburg. I would also like to thank Melvyn
Leffler, James Wilson, Stephen Macekura, Rhonda Barlow, Mary Barton, Evan McCormick, and the two
anonymous readers for Diplomatic History for their invaluable feedback.
2
Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy, Guatemala to United States Department of State, Washington, “Coup
Sitrep No. 5,” March 23, 1982, Confidential Cable 002106, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA),
nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed 14 November 2011); Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy, Guatemala to
United States Department of State, Washington, “Coup Sitrep No. 13,” March 24, 1982, Confidential Cable 002115,
DNSA, 2.
3
Chapin, “Coup Sitrep No. 13,” 2.
4
Joseph Anfuso and David Sczepanski, He Gives—He Takes Away: The True Story of Guatemala’s Controversial
Former President Efrain Rios Montt (Eureka, CA: Radiance Publications, 1983): 111. Global Outreach church,
which established el Verbo in Guatemala in 1976, published this account shortly after a coup removed Ríos Montt
from power in August, 1983. Curriculum Vitae del Gral. Rios Montt (25 March 1982), in Civil War, Society and
Political Transition in Guatemala: The Guatemala News and Information Bureau Archive, 1963 – 2000
(Woodbridge, CT: Primary Source Microfilm, 2004): Series 5, Roll 13.
1
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elders had gathered “to lay hands on Efraín, to pray over him as the Bible teaches, and basically
send him out from us with His blessings to the palace.” 5 Through prayer with these church
leaders, Ríos Montt came to believe that God had ordained him to lead the junta. 6 Within a few
months, he had marginalized the two other junta members, and he declared himself president of
Guatemala on June 5, 1982. 7 In public speeches and weekly radio and television sermonettes,
Ríos Montt emphasized his certainty that “the Lord God, in his infinite wisdom, had given [him]
the command to save the people of Guatemala,” a belief the elders of el Verbo nurtured. 8 As
president, he pledged to bring Christian moral precepts to bear on the problems of the nation, and
he called on the people and God to help him create a new Guatemala. 9
[FIGURE 1]
Ríos Montt’s rhetoric and the evident sincerity of his beliefs captured the imagination of
internationalist evangelical Christians in the United States. Seeing great potential to spread the
gospel in Central America through Ríos Montt’s Christian leadership, American evangelicals and
parachurch organizations aided his regime directly through public outreach, fundraising, and
congressional lobbying. Despite mounting evidence that his campaign against Guatemala’s
“communist insurgency” involved the mass killing of indigenous Mayans, evangelical groups
argued that the dictator’s Christian faith would compel him to improve the country’s human
Carlos Ramírez, interview by Bonnie Anderson and John Hart, “Headline: Guatemala / Rios Montt,” NBC Evening
News, 27 March 1982, available from: http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/program.pl?ID=522679.
6
Anderson and Hart, “Headline: Guatemala / Rios Montt”; Anfuso and Sczepanski, He Gives, 114-115, 117;
Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy, Guatemala to United States Department of State, Washington,
“Piedra/Carbaugh Visit: Impressions of President Rios Montt,” May 19, 1982, Confidential Cable 003591, DNSA.
7
Paul Taylor, United States Embassy, Guatemala to United States Department of State, Washington, “The Rios
Montt Presidency: A First Assessment,” June 16, 1982, Confidential Cable 004301, DNSA.
8
Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, “De La Tierra Arrasada a La Aldea Estrategica,” Crie Documentos Guatemala 4
(Septiembre, 1982), Archivo de la Coordinadora Alemana de Solidaridad con Guatemala, Cartapacio No. 156
Coleccion Infostelle Del 13.01.06 Al 13.01.07, Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica, Antigua
Guatemala, Sacatepéquez, Guatemala (hereafter CIRMA).
9
“Así lo dijo anoche en su mensaje por televisión el general Ríos Montt,” Prensa Libre (27 December 1982),
Publicación Diario El Imparcial, Serie: La Morgue (recortes de periódicos), Presidente: Gral. Rios Montt (19821983) Ramo: Gob, CIRMA.
5
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rights situation. Neo-Pentecostal missionaries and their Guatemalan brethren played a key role in
the Ríos Montt regime, shaping the dictator’s discussions with the Reagan administration,
factoring into his internal strategic planning, and guiding his understanding of his role as a
Christian leader. Support from U.S. and Guatemalan evangelicals for Ríos Montt and for Reagan
administration efforts to extend military aid to Guatemala became significant factors shaping
relations between the two countries.
The intricate, overlapping web of influence that U.S. Christians wove—or found
themselves woven into—in Guatemala in the early 1980s exemplified the transnational
connectivity, shared evangelistic goals, and extensive reach of the global evangelical community.
This essay links the circumstances and socio-political implications of the proliferation of
Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches in Guatemala during the late 1970s with the
theological and political beliefs that underpinned evangelical support for Ríos Montt in the
United States in the 1980s. It argues that connections between evangelicals in the United States
and in Guatemala influenced U.S. relations with the Ríos Montt regime and the response of the
Guatemalan government to U.S. policies. It offers a unique contribution to our understanding of
the political implications of global evangelicalism, placing evangelical involvement in the Ríos
Montt regime in an international context as part of a larger crusade to evangelize the world, and
also reveals how non-state actors shaped U.S. relations with Central America in this period. 10

Scholars of religion, sociology, political science, and history have examined this period in Guatemalan history
from various perspectives. Those that explore evangelicalism and the Ríos Montt regime focus on how this dynamic
played out in Guatemala exclusively, though some discuss the role of American evangelicals within Guatemala and
their ties with the Reagan administration. This paper builds on works that expose the involvement of American
evangelicals in supporting the Ríos Montt regime, but shifts the focus to examine this phenomenon from the
perspective of U.S. international relations and foreign policy making. In viewing these events through the lens of
recent scholarship on non-governmental organizations and internationalist Christian outreach, it links the
evangelistic aims of U.S. Christians with geopolitical developments abroad, offering new insight into how
evangelicals affected US-Central American relations. For the definitive book on Ríos Montt’s presidency,
counterinsurgency campaigns, and genocide against the Maya, see Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of
the Holy Spirit: Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982 – 1983 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
10
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From Jesus Freaks to Global Outreach: Sending Spiritual Aid to the Suffering
At just after 3am on the morning of February 4, 1976, a devastating 7.5 MW earthquake
struck Guatemala, radiating death and destruction throughout the country. 23,000 people
perished and more than 76,000 suffered injuries. 11 The earthquake exacted a staggering
economic toll, leaving over a million homeless, with large swaths of Guatemala City and other
towns reduced to rubble and critical infrastructure destroyed. 12 Christian relief agencies and
churches in the United States responded immediately, sending food, clothing, building supplies,
and medical aid to help in the rescue and recovery efforts. The response from these groups
proved so effective that within two weeks of the earthquake, the Ford administration’s
coordinator for disaster relief “urged persons wishing to help to contact church and private sector
organizations,” rather than government agencies. 13 Although most Guatemalans were at least
nominally Catholic at the time, evangelical Christian groups, including the National Association
of Evangelicals’ World Relief Commission, the Assemblies of God World Missions, and the
Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board, delivered substantial aid to their brethren and others
suffering from the effects of the earthquake. 14 They also sent in missionaries. Ultimately, the
extent and success of the evangelistic outreach that the earthquake triggered turned Guatemala

2010). On the role of evangelicalism in the Guatemalan Civil War and Ríos Montt’s counterinsurgency strategy, see
Veronica Melander, The Hour of God?: People in Guatemala Confronting Political Evangelicalism and
Counterinsurgency (1976-1990) (Uppsala: Swedish Institute of Missionary Research, 1999); David Stoll,
“Evangelicals, Guerrillas, and the Army: The Ixil Triangle Under Rios Montt,” in Harvest of Violence: Maya
Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis, edited by Robert M. Carmack (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1988). For recent work on evangelical internationalism see Andrew Preston, “Evangelical Internationalism: A
Conservative Worldview for the Age of Globalization,” in The Right Side of the Sixties: Reexamining
Conservatism's Decade of Transformation, ed. Laura Jane Gifford and Daniel K. Williams (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012): 221-242.
11
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center, “February 4, 1976 Los
Amateos Guatemala Earthquake,” http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazardimages/event/show/9.
12
Orlando Olcese, “The Guatemala Earthquake Disaster of 1976: A Review of its Effects and of the Contribution of
the United Nations Family,” (Guatemala: United Nations Development Programme, 1977): 1.
13
Russell Chandler, “Church Relief Agencies Move Quickly to Aid Guatemala Earthquake Victims,” Los Angeles
Times (21 February 1976): A26.
14
Ibid.
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into one of the most Protestant nations in Latin America, a transformation that had profound
implications for Guatemalan society and politics. 15
One week after the disaster, Billy Graham chartered a private plane from Mexico with
Latin American evangelist Luis Palau to tour the most devastated areas and offer spiritual solace.
The destruction and misery they witnessed overwhelmed them. During a meeting with
Guatemalan President Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García, Graham stated that although the Billy
Graham Evangelistic Association had sent in large shipments of food, medicine, and clothing,
the aid provided to that point was insufficient to meet the tremendous need. He promised to send
more. 16 Yet for Graham and other evangelicals concerned with helping Guatemala rebuild from
the tragedy, material assistance alone would not suffice. They believed the nation needed
Christian salvation as well. In a statement to the press, Graham declared that despite the
devastation, the earthquake could serve a greater purpose and turn out to be a blessing, as the
“‘tears shed by Guatemalans may be the way to reconciliation with God.’” 17 Urging the populace
to accept that “‘peace can only be found in Jesus Christ,’” Graham made it clear that he saw the
earthquake as a potential catalyst for mass conversion and, therefore, salvation. 18 Missionminded evangelicals throughout the United States shared Graham’s view. The disaster presented
a tremendous opportunity for evangelical expansion, and they seized it.
The impulse to send spiritual as well as material aid to help those affected by the disaster
reflected core evangelical beliefs about the relationship between evangelization and social action.
Regardless of denomination, evangelicals shared a belief that they must engage in missionary
The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the
World’s Christian Population, Pew Research Center (December 2011). Available from:
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/12/Christianity-fullreport-web.pdf
16
“Declaró Billy Graham Tras su Recorrido,” Diario El Imparcial (14 Febrero 1976), Publicación Diario El
Imparcial, Serie: La Morgue (recortes de periódicos), GRAHAM, Billy, Ficha: S/7158 (2) 1-9, Ramo: Biográfricos,
CIRMA.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
15
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work or evangelism to “make disciples of all nations,” as Jesus commanded in his Great
Commission to the eleven disciples at Galilee. 19 For premillennialist evangelicals such as
Graham, this Great Commission figured prominently into their understanding of eschatology.
Premillenialists believed that “Jesus Christ will return personally and visibly, in power and glory,
to consummate his salvation and his judgment,” as described in the books of Mark, Matthew,
Hebrews, Revelation and others. 20 They interpreted these Scriptures as prophecy and trusted that,
upon the fulfillment of biblical predictions, Christ would return to usher in the Kingdom of God
on Earth. 21 World evangelization played a key role in those apocalyptic predictions, as many
evangelicals read scriptures such as Matthew 24:14 (“And this gospel of the kingdom will be
preached in the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then the end will come”) and Mark
13:10 (“And the good news must first be proclaimed to all nations”) as evidence that evangelism
must precede the second coming. 22
In an era fraught with debate over liberation theology and the embrace of a social justice
rather than a missionary orientation within Catholicism and mainline Protestant denominations,
evangelicals held fast to their commitment to global evangelism. 23 When religious leaders from
150 countries gathered in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1974 for Billy Graham’s International
Congress on World Evangelization, the place of social action in the hierarchy of Christian
responsibility emerged as a major point of debate. Many Western evangelicals viewed global
Mt 28:16-20 (New International Version), “the great commission.” See also Mt 24:14; Mk 13:10, 16:15.
“The Lausanne Covenant,” in Let the Earth Hear His Voice: International Congress on World Evangelization,
Lausanne, Switzerland Official Reference Volume, ed. J. D. Douglas (Minneapolis, MN: World Wide Publications,
1975), 8-9.
21
Gayraud S. Wilmore, Last Things First (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1992), 47-48.
22
Mt 24:14 (NIV); Mk 13:10 (NRSV), referenced in “The Lausanne Covenant,” 9.
23
Al Tizon, Transformation After Lausanne: Radical Evangelical Mission in Global-Local Perspective (Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008): 54-58; Dana Robert, “The Great Commission in an age of Globalization,” in The Antioch
Agenda: The Restorative Church at the Margins. Celebrating the Life and Work of Orlando Costas, ed. D. Jeyaraj,
R. Pazmino, and R. Petersen (New Delhi, India: Indian Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 2007): 67; Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007).
19
20
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efforts to spread the Gospel as the most significant form of social action they could undertake as
Christians. 24 At the Congress, Fuller Theological Seminary professor Donald McGavran argued
that “men have no greater needs than to be reconciled to their Father and to walk in the Light.” 25
Though he acknowledged the pressing material needs that many faced throughout the world and
welcomed Christian efforts to bring about change, McGavran pushed back against “the drive to
replace evangelism with social action.” 26 He argued that salvation and church expansion
provided the fundamental building blocks for “a righteous, peaceful society.” 27 From this
perspective, which informed evangelical disaster relief efforts throughout the world, there could
be no greater salvation for the suffering than salvation in Christ. 28
In addition to the famous evangelists and major parachurch organizations that delivered
assistance to Guatemala, missionaries from a number of small, independent evangelical churches
fanned out into the cities and countryside to help the country rebuild and to plant churches. The
rapid proliferation of these mostly neo-Pentecostal congregations reshaped not just the religious
landscape of Guatemala, but the social and political culture as well. Sociologists and scholars of
religion have argued that conversion to Protestantism and, in Latin America specifically, to
Pentecostalism, facilitated social mobility among believers and modernization throughout the
economy more broadly. 29 In Guatemala, this proved true in the case of the many neo-Pentecostal
Harold Lindsell, “Lausanne 74: An Appraisal,” Christianity Today (September 13, 1974), 21.
Donald McGavran, “The Dimensions of World Evangelization,” in Let the Earth Hear His Voice: International
Congress on World Evangelization, Lausanne, Switzerland Official Reference Volume, ed. J. D. Douglas
(Minneapolis, MN: World Wide Publications, 1975), 95.
26
Ibid, 96.
27
Ibid.
28
The ICOWE inspired increased outreach from Western evangelicals and also encouraged indigenous evangelism
within Guatemala from Guatemalan religious leaders seeking to evangelize Ladinos and rural Mayans. See The
Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization, “Evangelization in Central America Today,” World Evangelization
Information Bulletin 17 (February 1980), Records of National Religious Broadcasters, Collection 309, Box 101,
Folder 13 LCWE Bulletins 1978-1983, Billy Graham Center, Wheaton, IL.
29
Harvey Cox, Fire from Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the TwentyFirst Century (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1995), 171. Cox notes that conversion to the Pentecostal faith
requires an often radical change in lifestyle, as believers must conform to its moral precepts. He argues that their
24
25
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congregations that sprang up in urban areas following the disaster.
Although the first Protestant missionaries had arrived in Guatemala in 1882, only about 7
percent of the population belonged to a Protestant or evangelical church prior to the 1976
earthquake. 30 As missionaries and evangelical NGOs streamed into Guatemala to aid the
suffering populace, the rate of conversion increased exponentially. According to survey data that
researchers at San Carlos University in Guatemala published in 1989, the Protestant population
grew by 14 percent between 1976 and 1978, and by 42 percent between 1978 and 1982. By
1982, just over 22 percent of the population belonged to a Protestant church. The rate continued
to increase throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 31 Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal denominations
accounted for a major share of this growth.
Missiologist Veronica Melander notes that not all of the Protestant expansion that
followed in the wake of the earthquake originated from churches that U.S. missionaries planted
after the disaster. Many long-established churches took the opportunity that the disaster
presented to expand into new territory. 32 Immediately after the earthquake, the Assemblies of
God, which had sent its first missionaries to Guatemala in 1934, shared optimistic reports from

“reputation for sobriety, punctuality, and honesty” makes Pentecostals sought after employees. In this manner, the
cultivation of the so-called “Protestant work ethic” has prepared such workers to participate in modern industrial
capitalism. See also Peter L. Berger, “Introduction: The Cultural Dynamics of Globalization,” in Many
Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, ed. Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 8. For the data Berger draws on linking Pentecostalism with social
mobility, see Arturo Fontaine Talavera, “Trends Toward Globalization in Chile,” in Many Globalizations: Cultural
Diversity in the Contemporary World, ed. Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002): 271-274.
30
Luis Samandú, Claudia Dary Fuentes, and Vitalino Similox Salazar, El protestantismo en Guatemala (Guatemala:
Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, Dirección General de Investigación, 1989): 61. Most other Guatemalans
belonged to the Catholic Church and/or followed traditional Mayan spiritual practices.
31
Samandú, Fuentes, and Salazar, El protestantismo, 61. The authors noted that this percentage represented over
1.65 million people. Protestant sects continued to grow through the 1980s, comprising nearly 2.7 million, or 31.5
percent of the population, by 1988. Current estimates of the Protestant population in Guatemala range from 25 to 40
percent.
32
Melander, The Hour of God?, 74.
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local evangelists about the potential for revival in the disaster-stricken country. 33 Throughout the
following year, Assemblies of God missionaries launched 200 “Good News Crusades” in
Guatemala as part of a campaign—nicknamed “Invasion ’77”—to expand the reach of their
denomination. 34 Alongside the crusade activities of larger denominations, many small
evangelical churches established themselves in Guatemala City at this time, too. The diversity
and range of evangelical expansion efforts made for a vibrant “marketplace” of religion, which
helped to attract and retain new adherents. 35 These factors, along with the influx of funding from
evangelicals in the United States post-earthquake, contributed to the continuing spread of U.S.style evangelical Protestantism in Guatemala. 36
The particularities of U.S. evangelical belief and worship practices ensured that this
expansion wrought deep change in Guatemala, reshaping thousands of lives, coalescing with
ongoing political change in the country, and solidifying transnational ties with evangelicals in the
United States. People suffering from poverty and the destruction in Guatemala found neoPentecostalism attractive for both spiritual and material reasons. Theologian Néstor Medina
suggests that in addition to the fact that the Protestant churches proved more efficient than
Catholics at providing disaster relief, the message of Pentecostalism resonated with many
Guatemalans in the aftermath of the earthquake. 37 Medina notes that the conversion rate
continued to rise in Guatemala even as the inflow of aid tapered off, and as such he suggests:
Pentecostalism helped people rebuild their lives and make sense of their reality through
Loren Triplett, “Guatemala—Earthquake,” Press Statement (4 February 1976), 10-64-14 Guatemala: Guatemala
earthquake, 1976 5/5/4 ID: 50135, Flower Pentecostal Heritage Center, Springfield, Missouri (hereafter FPHC).
34
“Pray for Guatemala Crusades,” Pentecostal Evangel (13 November 1977): 17.
35
On the ways in which competition in the “religious economy” leads to higher levels of religious observance, see
Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious
Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006): 9, 11.
36
Ibid.
37
Néstor Medina, “The New Jerusalem versus Social Responsibility: The Challenges of Pentecostalism in
Guatemala,” in Perspectives in Pentecostal Eschatologies: World Without End, ed. Peter Althouse and Robby
Waddell (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2010): 326.
33
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apocalyptic lenses. The Pentecostal message of the imminent coming of the Lord, war,
suffering, and earthquakes as signs of the end times contributed greatly to people flocking
to Pentecostal churches. The eschatological message seemed to fit the social and political
context. 38
In addition to the apocalyptic overtones of the disaster itself, neo-Pentecostal churches
took advantage of the rush of internal migration from rural villages to Guatemala City that the
earthquake jumpstarted. According to Virginia Garrard-Burnett, evangelicals offered these rural
immigrants food, shelter, and loans to help them establish themselves in the city—essential
assistance that the Catholic Church and local government did not provide. 39 Evangelical
churches “actively encouraged the economic improvement of their members by conflating
notions of material and spiritual well-being.” 40 With their insistence on sobriety and the
inculcation of the so-called Protestant work ethic, conversion to Pentecostalism often led to
upward social mobility. 41 Additionally, the prayer meetings, women’s groups, and associations
that evangelical churches organized gave migrants a sense of community, which helped
counterbalance the otherwise isolating experience of their new urban lives. 42
The particular form of U.S. Pentecostal worship, with its emphasis on ecstatic expression
and the experience of an “unmediated, personal relationship with God,” drew immigrants in, yet
it also blended syncretically with elements of indigenous spirituality that had persisted in rural

Ibid, 327.
Garrard-Burnett, Protestantism, 121-22.
40
Ibid, 123.
41
Ibid; Cox, Fire, 171-172; Berger, “Introduction,” 8.
42
Garrard-Burnett, Protestantism, 122; Cox, Fire, 15; Kevin Lewis O'Neill, City of God: Christian Citizenship In
Postwar Guatemala (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010): 23. These authors note that due to its size and
organizational structure, the Catholic church could not offer the small-scale, responsive outreach and individualized
attention that evangelical groups did. These services proved enormously appealing to newly-arrived migrants, many
of whom were nominally Catholic. That Pentecostal worship helped migrants cope with city life was not a new
observation; it has been well documented in the sociological literature. Rather it is this phenomenon coupled with
the scale of migration that followed the earthquake that made this situation in Guatemala so transformative. For
earlier accounts of this phenomenon, see Bryan R. Roberts, “Protestant Groups and Coping with Urban Life in
Guatemala City,” American Journal of Sociology 73, no. 6 (May 1968): 753-759, 761.
38
39
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villages. 43 This syncretism supplied a comforting familiarity for migrants and aided the vast
expansion of neo-Pentecostal churches from the urban core to the rural highlands and beyond. 44
Significantly, although Pentecostalism spread quickly and became indigenized among rural
Mayans, Pentecostal churches in the cities tended to retain an American character and bonds
with counterparts in the United States, even as local leaders gradually took over from the original
missionaries. 45 El Verbo, with its ties to the Gospel Outreach Church in California, typified this
pattern of urban church growth and connectivity.
Gospel Outreach, the Guatemalan Civil War, and Ríos Montt
Shortly after the earthquake struck in 1976, Gospel Outreach Reverend Carlos Ramírez
led fifteen missionaries and six of their children from the California church to Guatemala City to
assist in the reconstruction efforts and to spread the Gospel. 46 Initially, they focused their efforts
on helping local people rebuild their houses. Soon, however, they began to hold regular Bible
study meetings in the homes of middle and upper-class residents of Guatemala City. 47 Ríos
Montt joined one of these Bible study groups in 1979 at the urging of a fellow army officer.
Ramírez and Jim DeGolyer, another American Gospel Outreach pastor, led the group, which
included future Ríos Montt advisors Francisco Bianchi and Álvaro Contreras. 48 Through these
meetings, which involved prayer, close readings of Scripture, and discussions of the personal
O’Neill, City, 24; Cox, Fire, 101.
Cox, Fire, 101-102.
45
Calvin L. Smith, “Pentecostal presence, power and politics in Latin America,” Journal Of Beliefs & Values:
Studies In Religion & Education 30, no. 3 (December 2009): 224-225.
46
Guatemala Task Force, “Biography of Carlos Ramírez, Pastor of Verbo Christian Church in Guatemala Fact
Sheet,” Press Release, Undated [ca. 1982-1983], Guatemala in The North American Congress on Latin America
(NACLA) Archive on Latin Americana (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1998): roll 19, file 90,
frames 907-908; Joseph Anfuso and David Sczepanski, Efrain Rios Montt, Servant or Dictator?: The Real Story of
Guatemala's Controversial Born-Again President (Ventura, CA, U.S.A.: Vision House, 1984), 77. Ramírez, a
United States citizen of Colombian origin, had joined the Gospel Outreach Church in 1971 and became an ordained
minister in the church in 1975.
47
Cristobal Vargas, “Guatemala: A New Jerusalem?” Latinamerican Press 3 (February 1983): 3-4, in Civil War,
Society and Political Transition in Guatemala, Series 5 Roll 13.
48
Anfuso and Sczepanski, Efrain Rios Montt, 81, 83.
43
44
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challenges each participant faced, Ríos Montt had a salvation experience and became a “born
again” Christian. 49
Ríos Montt’s receptivity to evangelicalism stemmed from personal setbacks linked to
government corruption and the ongoing Guatemalan Civil War. 50 In 1974, after serving in the
Guatemalan army for nearly thirty years, at various points as director of the Army’s Escuela
Politécnica, as brigadier general, and as Army chief of staff, he had run for president on the
Christian Democratic ticket. He and his running mate won popular support and the majority of
the votes on a platform of moderate reform. Yet rampant electoral fraud at the hands of the
extreme right-wing Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) party denied him his victory.
After the stolen election, the Guatemalan Minister of Defense assigned Ríos Montt to serve as a
military attaché in Madrid, Spain in order to prevent him from posing a threat to Kjell Laugerud,
whose triumph at the polls the MLN and sitting president General Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio
had coordinated. 51 The loss of the presidency and forced exile left Ríos Montt embittered. 52
Within Guatemala, widespread disaffection over the fraudulent election, coupled with the
insufficiency of military reform programs, reignited the guerrilla movement. 53 In response,
General Lucas García, whom Kjell Laugerud handpicked as his successor in 1978, intensified the
repression against the guerrillas and indigenous groups, employing death squads to assassinate

Ibid, 87. Ríos Montt’s wife and children converted as well. Prior to conversion, the family had been Catholic.
In 1954, the CIA and right-wing military leader Carlos Castillo Armas overthrew the democratically-elected
Jacobo Arbenz, reversing ten years of popular reforms and unleashing a wave of repression and political instability.
The resultant civil war lasted from 1960-1996, during which a succession of right-wing presidents, nearly all hailing
from the military, waged a protracted battle against left-leaning insurgents over issues related to land tenure and
economic justice. Through a combination of brutal state violence and incremental reform, the military had
temporarily succeeded in subduing the insurgency by the early 1970s.
51
Garrard-Burnett, Terror, 42-43; Stoll, “Guatemala,” 28.
52
United States Defense Intelligence Agency, “Biographic Information on Leader of March 1982 Coup in
Guatemala,” March 28, 1982, Confidential Cable, DNSA; Anfuso and Sczepanski, He Gives, 64-81.
53
Garrard-Burnett, Terror, 34-35, 42.
49
50
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political enemies and massacring entire Mayan villages indiscriminately. 54 His government
justified these depredations with Cold War ideology, linking the guerrillas with Cuban
communism and characterizing guerrilla successes as progress toward totalitarianism and an
existential threat to the state. 55 The state violence further radicalized the populace and earned
Guatemala international censure for human rights violations.
While the situation in Guatemala deteriorated, Ríos Montt grew increasingly frustrated
with his life in exile. In 1977, the Escuela Politécnica that he had attended as a cadet and later
led as its director invited him to attend the inauguration of its new facilities. 56 He used the
invitation as a means to return home permanently, informing government officials that he would
not resume his post in Madrid. The minister of defense placed him on inactive military status,
and Ríos Montt retired to private life, where he nursed hopes that another opportunity to run for
president would present itself. 57 Not long after, he began attending el Verbo prayer meetings.
In their recollections of Ríos Montt’s conversion experience, church elders suggested that
the general found relief from his bitterness over the lost election and exile in the evangelical
teachings and lively spiritual community of el Verbo. 58 These fundamental Pentecostal elements
hewed closely to those of the Gospel Outreach Church, which Ramírez had modeled el Verbo
after in message, worship style, and mission when he established his ministry in Guatemala in
1976. Gospel Outreach had grown out of the Jesus Movement that swept the United States in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, attracting disaffected youth who found the emotionality of Christian
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revivals, emphasis on the Holy Spirit, and simple, communal living an appealing alternative to
mainstream culture. 59
Jim Durkin, a California real estate agent and evangelical preacher, had founded Gospel
Outreach after he began ministering to a small group of Jesus People who had rented one of his
buildings for use as a “coffee house ministry.” 60 The church grew rapidly as hundreds of people,
including a young Carlos Ramírez, flocked to the Lighthouse Ranch and other properties that
Durkin had acquired for the fledgling church. 61 There, according to Gospel Outreach materials,
“many of them found the Lord Jesus Christ as their Savior and decided to stay.” 62 The vision that
Durkin articulated to his followers entailed three core evangelical tenets, drawn from Scripture:
“to preach the gospel to every creature,” to “have the same unity with each other as the Lord
Jesus had with His Father” in order to “effectively carry out God’s work,” and “to be
individually conformed to the image of Christ.” 63
These deeply held evangelical beliefs about the necessity of Christian witness to fulfill
the Great Commission motivated Durkin and the other leaders of Gospel Outreach to propagate
their model of worship throughout the United States and the rest of the world. Within a decade of
its founding, Gospel Outreach had established ministries in 44 U.S., European, and Latin
American cities—including el Verbo in Guatemala. 64 The promise of individual salvation,
energetic worship, and tight-knit community that attracted Ríos Montt brought a number of other
The Jesus Movement blended Charismatic and evangelical forms of Christianity with the hippie counterculture of
the 1960s. Patrick Allitt, Religion In America Since 1945: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003):
133-137.
60
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local residents, including prominent business and political leaders, into the fold. By 1982, el
Verbo boasted 1,200 members, with an additional 450 children enrolled in the affiliated school. 65
While el Verbo engaged in efforts to expand throughout the Guatemalan countryside and
into other Latin American countries, it retained close ties with its parent church in California.
The relationship extended beyond communications between the original Gospel Outreach
missionaries and Gospel Outreach leaders, and a network of intellectual exchange between
Guatemalan evangelical converts and their U.S. counterparts flourished. Indeed, in 1979, Ríos
Montt visited the California church with his wife and daughter, meeting with the founders and
speaking at church services. 66 Encouraging reciprocal bonds of kinship with members of its
missionary churches, Gospel Outreach embraced a policy of global engagement aimed at
building a cohesive community of believers that transcended national boundaries—a goal that
many U.S. evangelicals shared.
As one of hundreds of similar Guatemalan evangelical churches, el Verbo stood out
mostly for its relationship with Ríos Montt, yet the political connections and social mobility of
its members exemplified the socio-political realignment that emerged from evangelical
expansion in Guatemala during this period. Core theological and political predilections led
evangelical Protestants, particularly neo-Pentecostals such as the followers of el Verbo, into a de
facto alliance with the right-leaning Lucas government. With their deep commitment to
evangelism, rooted in eschatological imperatives as well as to their faith in the centrality of
individual salvation, evangelicals focused first on otherworldly, rather than worldly, matters.
Ostensibly, this meant they avoided politics. In practice, however, it led them to support the
status quo, at least tacitly. Like their counterparts in the United States, many Guatemalan
65
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evangelicals rigidly opposed communism. Communist ideology and objectives stood in direct
opposition to evangelical ideology and objectives, as they posed a threat to evangelism and
salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. As such, most evangelicals supported government efforts
to quell the insurgency. 67
When the growing frequency and ruthlessness of army massacres between 1980 and early
1982 led to increased public support for the guerrillas and greater solidarity among indigenous
and leftist religious groups, the ruling regime looked to the rapidly expanding evangelical sects
to shore up political support. By the time the campaign for the 1982 presidential election began,
Protestants comprised nearly 20 percent of the Guatemalan population, a sizeable potential
voting bloc. President Lucas’s hand-selected successor, General Ángel Aníbal Guevara, courted
them. He donated money to American missionary churches and appeared at an evangelical
revival held at the national soccer stadium, where he promised the 50,000 people in attendance
that he would give “special consideration to evangelicals in his administration” if elected. 68
With the army overseeing the election, Lucas ensured Guevara’s victory. When the other
candidates and their supporters protested the blatant election fraud, the regime swiftly and
violently repressed their dissent. 69
Yet Lucas could not stifle the seething anger that the Guatemalan people, including those
in the military, felt over the election and the country’s state of affairs. 70 Within weeks, a cadre of
young army officers staged the coup that removed Lucas from power and placed Ríos Montt at
Most, though certainly not all. Progressive and leftist evangelicals did have a voice in Guatemala, and some
worked with leftist evangelical groups in the United States, such as the Association for Public Justice. For recent
work on the evolution of a radical evangelical left in Central America in this period, see Rodney A. Coeller, Beyond
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(unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2012), American University, Washington, D.C.
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the head of the new ruling junta. Their demands made clear that they sought, above all else, to
reinstate free and fair elections in Guatemala. After taking power, they announced that “the junta
would govern for 60 days during which time it will supervise national elections and no military
candidates would be permitted to stand for office.” 71
Bringing God and Evangelical Aspirations to Guatemalan Governance
Although the young officers did not realize that Ríos Montt had converted to evangelical
Christianity when they asked him to head the junta, the soaring religious rhetoric that animated
his first speech to the nation on the evening of March 23, 1982, made his new outlook apparent.
Ríos Montt’s proclamations after the coup, and in the months that followed, seemed to indicate
to U.S. and Guatemalan evangelicals his intentions to improve life in his country and help fulfill
the Great Commission by turning Guatemala to God. Dressed in military fatigues and flanked by
the other junta leaders at his first press conference on the evening of the coup, Ríos Montt told
the assembled reporters, “I am trusting God, my Lord and my King, to enlighten me because he
is the only one who gives or takes away authority.” 72
[FIGURE 2]
Having thus expressed his belief that divine will had placed him in power, he pledged to
the people of Guatemala that “he and his two junta partners have a mission to revitalize the
nation’s moral values, extend more human rights, and cut down on corruption.” 73 In keeping
with evangelical doctrine concerning individual salvation, he stressed that each Guatemalan must
work toward improving the country, noting that only “once there is peace in your heart…there
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will be peace in society.” 74 He reiterated these themes in weekly sermons broadcast throughout
Guatemala on Sundays, urging his countrymen to live according to Christian morality and to
spread the Gospel so that they could “share the joy of knowing God.” 75
For their part, many Guatemalans viewed the coup and the new ruling triumvirate
cautiously. Despite his reputation as a political moderate and his identity as a “born again”
Christian, Ríos Montt was still a brigadier general in the army. The other junta leaders,
Maldonado Schaad and Gordillo Martínez, served as a general and a colonel, respectively. The
Washington Office on Latin America and the Catholic Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio (IGE)
argued that, although Guatemalans welcomed the end to urban violence that Ríos Montt effected
after taking power, little else had changed:
The oppressive apparatus of the army is still in place and there is absolutely no indication
that the Junta is about to introduce the far-reaching reforms that the country needs to
remove the social, economic and political contradictions that condemn the vast majority
of the population to a life of degradation and poverty. 76
Indeed, many Guatemalan Catholics railed against Ríos Montt’s religious rhetoric. 77 Decrying
Ríos Montt as a false prophet, leftist Catholic and Christian organizations, including IGE, Comite
Pro-Justicia y Paz de Guatemala, and Cristianos Revolucionarios ‘Vicente Menchú,’ cultivated a
steady stream of opposition to the general. 78
Nevertheless, Ríos Montt’s rise to power inspired a dizzying sense of possibility among
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evangelicals living in Guatemala and the United States, stirring tremendous excitement and
expectation about his potential to further evangelical aims. Evangelicals took his statements of
faith at face value and believed, earnestly, that God had chosen Ríos Montt to lead Guatemala to
advance evangelism—which they saw as the only tenable solution to Guatemala’s struggles. 79
Missionaries writing home to friends, family, and fellow church members in the United States
declared Ríos Montt a “spirit-filled Christian” and “born-again believer,” calling on their coreligionists to pray that his ascension would win new souls to Christ. 80 In Gospel Outreach’s
newsletter Radiance Monthly, church founder Jim Durkin explained the significance of Ríos
Montt’s leadership from an evangelical perspective:
. . . we believe that in Guatemala—through prayer and offensive spiritual warfare against
the enemy—Satan and his prince (principality) have been toppled. I believe that if we
continue in prayer there is tremendous opportunity in Guatemala to show the life and
power of Jesus Christ. Justice, prosperity, and blessings can come to a hurting people
who are crying out for help. Christ Jesus Himself is that help. 81
Standing in front of a map of Latin America on the 700 Club one week after the coup, Pat
Robertson made a similar plea, intoning, “God we pray for Ríos Montt, your servant, Lord that
you would cover him. . . Lord we thank you that your spirit is moving in Guatemala. And we
pray right now, heavenly father, for this great nation in Jesus’ holy name.” 82
U.S. evangelicals saw in Ríos Montt a divinely ordained opening for increased
evangelism in the predominantly Catholic countries of Central America. They lavished him with
financial support and provided access to political elites in the United States, inspiring his
El Verbo elder Henry Gómez framed these struggles using the language of spiritual warfare, noting in an
interview, “‘[we] aren’t fighting a battle of flesh, blood and bone. We’re combating the hordes that invade the
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confidence that they would underwrite his policies. Indeed, he told U.S. Ambassador to
Guatemala Frederic Chapin that he expected U.S. Christians would send him a billion dollars in
development aid. 83
In this manner, the evangelicalism that flourished after the 1976 earthquake offered Ríos
Montt a useful moral language for distinguishing himself from past regimes while also
connecting him with new allies in the United States eager to aid him in his fight against the same
“communist insurgents” whom his predecessors had targeted. These relationships moved to the
fore as Ríos Montt developed strategies to reform his government, extract military aid from the
United States, and defeat the insurgency.
Ríos Montt, Ronald Reagan, and the Evangelical Connection
When Ríos Montt took power in March 1982, he looked to the leaders of his church for
spiritual, personal, and professional guidance. He appointed el Verbo elders Francisco Bianchi
and Álvaro Contreras executive secretary and secretary of public relations, respectively, vital
positions that allowed them privileged access to him and significant policy influence.
Referencing their participation in meetings with embassy staff, Ambassador Chapin noted, “it
was evident not only at the dinner but at the meeting with the congressional staffers . . . that the
two young church leaders play an important role in molding President Rios Montt’s views and
policies.” 84 Although Chapin bristled at their religious rambling, the general believed their
appointments would help him instill morality in the government. 85
Ríos Montt aspired to govern Guatemala with the Bible in mind. He shared the view of
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American el Verbo pastor Jim DeGolyer, who noted, “‘there is an amazing amount of guidance
that the Bible gives kings, heads of state, in how they should rule.’” 86 Ríos Montt utilized the
teachings of DeGolyer and other el Verbo advisers in his speeches and sermonettes, mused on
them in discussions with staffers and officials from the U.S. government, and incorporated them
into his domestic policies. 87 Soon after coming to power, he launched an anti-corruption program
that he named “Project David,” in reference to the biblical King David of Israel, whom he
regarded as a virtuous ruler. 88 As part of this program, he called on all government officials to
pledge “No robo. No miento. No abuso,” or “I will not steal. I will not lie. I will not abuse.” 89 He
also drew attention to his efforts to root out and prosecute corrupt officials. 90
U.S. evangelical magazines and newspapers praised the president for “Project David,”
offering it as concrete evidence of the sincerity of his promise to bring justice and Biblical rule to
his country. 91 Within Guatemala, the anti-corruption measures and weekly sermonettes led to a
rapid decline in crime, political repression, and death squad activity in urban centers. 92
According to Virginia Garrard-Burnett, these initiatives “contribut[ed] to urban residents’ sense
of personal safety and thus len[t] social support to the Ríos Montt regime, especially among the
urban middle and upper classes.” 93 Evangelicals, as well as the U.S. government, seized on these
improvements as a sign that Ríos Montt intended to honor his pledge to promote human rights in
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Guatemala. 94
Yet Guatemalans whom he regarded as subversive or as communist sympathizers
remained outside of his moral compass. During a post-coup press conference, Ríos Montt
growled angrily that his enemies should lay down their arms immediately, as “anyone who is
outside the law will be executed.” 95 As the violence in the cities where the mostly-Ladino
population resided declined in the first months of Ríos Montt’s government, the Guatemalan
army moved with devastating efficiency in the rural highlands, systematically killing guerrillas
and Mayan civilians. 96 After offering the guerrillas a one month amnesty period in May, Ríos
Montt launched Fusiles y Frijoles (“Rifles and Beans”), the first phase of his Victoria 82
counterinsurgency program, on June 20, 1982. Under this program, the government assessed
Guatemalan villages to determine the loyalty of the residents, classing them white for “friendly,”
red for “enemy,” or pink for those “of uncertain allegiance.” 97 According to reports, those who
supported the government received food, housing and other forms of government largess; those
perceived as foes met with “whatever force [was] considered necessary.” 98 The army occupied
“red” villages, killed suspected guerrillas, and forcibly relocated any remaining residents to
“strategic” villages. 99 After the pacification program took effect and the guerrilla forces started
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christened “model villages”—and increased the use of civilian patrols to continue the fight
against the insurgency. 100
Although human rights watch groups raised concerns about Ríos Montt’s military
strategy, U.S. foreign policy makers and the Reagan administration cautiously embraced his
leadership, finding his religiously-infused rhetoric moderate in comparison to previous regimes
and his commitment to fighting the “communist insurgency” encouraging. 101 But tensions
between the two governments arose from congressional opposition to providing any military aid
to Ríos Montt—specifically its refusal to sell his government the spare helicopter parts it needed
to wage war against the guerrillas in the remote, mountainous regions of Guatemala. 102 In
response to Congressional intransigence, evangelicals in the United States and Guatemala
facilitated direct meetings between the regime and U.S. government officials, and conducted a
public relations campaign to counter the negative impressions that members of Congress and the
American public held about the troubled Central American nation.
In an effort to improve bilateral relations, evangelicals from the United States invited
Francisco Bianchi to attend a meeting at the home of William Middendorf, the U.S. Ambassador
to the Organization of American States and a fellow believer, in June 1982. 103 They also invited
Ambassador Chapin, Reagan cabinet members Edwin Meese and James Watt, evangelical
leaders Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, Gospel Outreach member Bob Means, and a handful of
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other evangelicals. 104 At the dinner, they brainstormed ways to help Ríos Montt. In addition to
direct military aid, Pat Robertson proposed coordinating a “Christian relief strategy” with
evangelicals in Guatemala. Aiding Guatemalan villagers whom the army had relocated with
building materials, medical care, food, and other donated goods would buttress the
counterinsurgency efforts and shore up support for the regime among people living in the rural
highlands. 105 After the meeting, the participants worked with key players in the evangelical
community and the government “to launch a national campaign to help Guatemala which will
also counter misinformation about the government.” 106 Bianchi and Álvaro Contreras networked
with evangelical leaders, meeting privately with Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, building
relationships with key members of the National Religious Broadcasters, and attending the 1982
Washington Rally for Jesus. 107
As the evangelical network within the United States sprang into action, it marshaled
supporters and funds from the religious, business, and political communities within which it
operated. According to The Nation, Pat Robertson proved particularly influential as a spokesman
for Ríos Montt; his televised “appeals for prayers and financial support for the regime. . . .
resulted in a flood of letters to the White House demanding U.S. military aid for Guatemala.” 108
Building on Robertson’s momentum, el Verbo pastor Carlos Ramírez, who served as unofficial
advisor to Ríos Montt, returned to the United States at the president’s request to appeal directly

Ibid.
Letter, Robert M. Pittenger to Edwin Meese, 18 August 1982, ID #094920 CO060, WHORM: Subject File,
Ronald Reagan Library. Pittenger, a member of Campus Crusade for Christ, attended the meeting.
106
Ibid. Those involved included Billy Graham, Bill Bright of Campus Crusade for Christ, Senator Roger Jepsen,
Congressman Jack Kemp, and Senator Bill Armstrong.
107
Jose Efrain Rios Montt to Dr. Jerry Falwell, July 2, 1982, FAL 5-7 Series 1 Folder 1, Correspondence with
Foreign Political Leaders: 1980-1984, Liberty University Archive, Lynchburg, VA; Ben Armstrong to General Jose
Efrain Rios Montt, 7 December 1982, Records of National Religious Broadcasters - Collection 309, Box 63, Folder
3, International Banquet/Guests ’83 Convention, Billy Graham Center Archives, Wheaton, IL.
108
Eberwine, “To Ríos Montt,” 238.
104
105

Lauren Frances Turek 25

to American Christians. 109 Fundraising letters from his organization, Love Lift International,
emphasized that supporting Ríos Montt’s regime would hasten global evangelism, bring freedom
to the Guatemalan people, and help defeat communism in the region. 110
These promises resonated with U.S. evangelicals. In September, Ramírez met with
pastors in California to establish the Guatemalan Task Force, which worked as the American
“base of support” for his organization. 111 This group asserted that “God is the Author of the
tremendous changes taking place today in Guatemala,” and affirmed their commitment “to
support the spiritual revival and the peaceful socio-economic revolution that revival is bringing
about,” noting “the whole nation of Guatemala will benefit as a result.” 112 They partnered with
Youth with a Mission, a major missionary organization founded in 1960, to gather and deliver
tools, medicine, clothing, food, and other supplies to the poor and displaced in Guatemala. 113 Pat
Robertson informed viewers of the 700 Club that the donated materials would help indigenous
refugees who had fled their villages to escape guerilla depredations; without support, Robertson
alleged, communist forces would overrun Guatemala. 114 Congressman Jack Kemp endorsed
these initiatives and warned about the consequences of failing to provide Ríos Montt with aid. 115
By the end of 1982, evangelical efforts to encourage the Reagan administration to push
Congress to extend military aid to Guatemala began to bear fruit. In early December, Ríos Montt
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and Reagan met in Honduras, the last stop on Reagan’s tour of Latin America. 116 During an NSC
planning meeting prior to the trip, Secretary of State George Shultz had summed up the cautious
optimism surrounding Ríos Montt that had developed within the administration, telling Reagan,
“I have my fingers crossed on this one. We must make the effort to encourage movement toward
democracy; they are doing better now than they have for a long time. But, don’t throw your arms
around him.” 117 The NSC stressed to Reagan that Ríos Montt represented a significant break
from past regimes. Reagan’s advisors underscored the importance of reassuring the Guatemalan
leader that the United States supported him, yet they also instructed:
He must understand that the GOG [Government of Guatemala] image abroad is so bad
that it is difficult for the democratic countries, including the United States, to convince
their legislatures to appropriate assistance. We should encourage him to continue the
human rights progress, which will help us in our effort to convince the Congress that the
GOG and USG share a common objective in defeating the guerrillas. 118
At the meeting, Ríos Montt gave President Reagan an overview of his programs and
reform efforts, emphasizing the progress his regime had made toward protecting human rights. 119
He provided Reagan and Shultz a folder of documents entitled, “Este Gobierno Tiene el
Compromiso de Cambiar” (“This Government has an Obligation to Change”), which included
descriptions of his government’s policies and transcripts of his major speeches—all of which
referenced his faith in God and its role in his efforts to create a new Guatemala. 120 After
affirming the Guatemalan government’s commitment to bringing “peace, reform, economic
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progress and democracy” to the country, Ríos Montt delved into the details of fusiles y frijoles
and his counterinsurgency strategy, casting both as positive steps toward providing for the
poor. 121 He stated that he planned to use the spare helicopter parts he sought from the United
States to engage in “humanitarian work such as airlifting food to Indian farmers who have fled
from their homes for fear of violence by subversive forces, the transportation of brigades of
doctors and social workers who provide services to refugees, and other comparable tasks.” 122
[FIGURE 3]
In this manner, Ríos Montt sought to persuade Reagan of his desire to win their shared
battle against communism. He repeated what he and his evangelical proponents in the United
States had stressed for months: reports from international human rights organizations and the
news media about massacres, kidnappings, torture, and the mass displacement of indigenous
Guatemalans misrepresented the situation on the ground. The guerrillas committed these crimes,
Ríos Montt argued, not the army. 123 Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Reagan
seemed to take the general at his word, calling him “a man of great integrity.” 124 In reality,
during the seventeen months Ríos Montt led Guatemala, nearly 86,000 people—mostly Maya—
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perished or disappeared at the hands of the army. 125 Military actions against Guatemalan villages
turned over a million people into refugees. 126
Influenced by Ríos Montt’s evangelical faith, Reagan asserted that the Guatemalan
government had “been getting a bum rap” from the liberal news media. 127 According to a news
correspondent reporting on the meeting in Honduras, “one administration aide said the president
was impressed by the intense, forceful style of the Guatemalan as well as Rios Montt’s
uncompromising faith in God.” 128 Afterwards, Reagan expressed his desire to reinstate military
aid to the regime, and over the ensuing months his administration worked assiduously to find
ways to provide support to Ríos Montt. 129 National Security Advisor William P. Clark assured
Jorge Serrano Elías, a neo-Pentecostal acolyte Ríos Montt had sent to the United States as his
personal emissary, that the Reagan administration was “doing its best” to convince Congress to
get them to be more responsive to and positive about Guatemala. 130
Evangelicals in the United States also pressured Congress and the administration to
extend military aid to Guatemala. In the weeks before and after Reagan’s meeting with Ríos
Montt, letters from supportive evangelicals poured into Washington. 131 Many emphasized
personal connections to Guatemala, referencing missionary work and independent travel there as
religious leaders. They often parroted the messages about Ríos Montt that the evangelical press,
Christian opinion leaders, and the regime itself put forth. One pastor writing to Reagan noted that
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he too lamented the “bum rap” he believed Ríos Montt had received in the American press.
Based on his conversations with Guatemalans in the rural highlands, he argued:
I believe his government is very humane, progressive and motivated by great integrity. I
do hope you will be able to get the modest aid for Guatemala which has been requested.
Their helicopter situation is critical, both for defense and evacuation of villages when the
communists strike. 132
Letters from rank and file evangelicals in the United States to the president, cabinet members,
and congressional representatives made manifest the power of the evangelical network to control
and propagate its message and political objectives from the elite level to the grassroots.
Ríos Montt and his advisors, cognizant of the influence that this network had on
evangelicals in the United States and, potentially, their elected representatives, invited a group of
fifteen evangelical leaders to visit Guatemala in late December, 1982. The group included Billy
Melvin, executive director of the National Association of Evangelicals, Jerry Ballard, director of
World Relief, David Howard, executive director of the World Evangelical Fellowship, J. Philip
Hogan, executive director of the Assemblies of God Division of Foreign Missions, and
Christopher Moree, a representative from the World Missions Division of the Church of God,
among others. Ríos Montt’s advisors choreographed the four day trip with great care. On the first
morning, the group visited the National Palace for a briefing with the president’s cabinet
members. J. Philip Hogan reported that Ríos Montt canceled one of his morning meetings in
order to pray with them before the session:
Accordingly, he came in in a very humble fashion, began to praise the Lord and give
glory to His name and tell about how real Jesus was to him and how he wanted to serve
God and his country. Most everyone was completely taken off their feet to find him a
bubbling over, hallelujah, praise God, shouting charismatic. There didn’t seem to be
anything superficial about it. He spoke in glowing terms of his relationship with the
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Lord. 133
Thus primed, the visitors listened attentively to the information they received about the military,
political, and refugee situations confronting the Guatemalan government. Next, U.S.
Ambassador Chapin spent over an hour and a half with the group, going “almost overboard in his
endorsement of President Ríos and what he is doing in Guatemala.” 134 Chapin spoke about the
improved human rights situation, reassuring the evangelical representatives that Ríos Montt had
ended all state-directed killings, and suggesting that any soldiers committing acts of violence had
just “been a little slow to get the message.” 135 He also emphasized the extent to which President
Reagan supported Ríos Montt. In between meetings with government officials, the visitors
conversed with local missionaries and Guatemalan evangelicals, all of whom emphasized their
faith in the general and their sense that his “efforts have been blessed of God in helping to restore
peace to their troubled country. . . and renewed vigor to the Evangelical community in
Guatemala.” 136
The next day, the group boarded military helicopters and flew ninety miles north of the
capital to visit a refugee camp in a region occupied by the insurgency. 137 Hogan described the
camp in terms that revealed the ideological lens through which both he and his hosts understood
Ríos Montt’s rural pacification program. Declaring the conditions better than those he had
observed in Southeast Asia and North Africa, Hogan stated that the camp contained “about 6,000
to 10,000 refugees who have, because of the scorched-earth policy of the communists, had to flee
their little farms and villages for protection.” 138 Once the government overcame the insurgency,
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the villagers could return to their land, he asserted. 139 Such accounts aimed explicitly to counter
claims from human rights organizations and internal dissident groups that Ríos Montt’s rural
pacification program was a “scorched-earth policy.” 140
On the final evening of the trip, Ríos Montt hosted a dinner at the palace for the visitors,
where he “shared his Christian testimony and spoke informally about some of his hopes for
Guatemala,” before asking his guests to “pray for him and his government.” 141 Upon their return
to the United States, the participants published laudatory accounts and analyses of their visit in
evangelical magazines. Moree urged readers of Evangel, the official Church of God magazine, to
take the Guatemalan president “at face value,” arguing that his regime had “demonstrated a great
respect for human rights” while noting that “recently captured documents indicate that the
guerrillas themselves believe they have been set back twenty-five years in their struggle because
of the new attitude of this government, its representatives, and the armed forces.” 142 Hogan
praised Ríos Montt for fighting the “dangerous and growing insurgency,” for establishing a state
council that included Mayan representatives, and for speaking to the Guatemalan citizens about
“his personal salvation and his aspirations that Guatemala be a peaceful, Christian land.” 143
Other periodicals picked up and referenced these accounts, ensuring that they received wide
distribution among believers in the United States. 144
These accounts, in turn, worked their way into letters that trip participants and other
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evangelicals wrote to encourage their congressional representatives to approve military aid to
Guatemala. Writing to Missouri Congressman Gene Taylor, Hogan emphasized the threat that
the “communist insurgents” posed to Ríos Montt’s government. He referenced his personal
conversations with soldiers, refugees, and local pastors who asserted that Ríos Montt had made
great strides toward protecting human rights, stating that because this information originated
from “the grass roots,” he trusted in its veracity completely. 145 Hoping to provide additional
evidence to encourage support for military aid and to counter negative press from human rights
organizations, Taylor forwarded Hogan’s letter to William Clark, noting, “because of recent
newspaper accounts of the situation there, I thought that Mr. Hogan’s evaluation would be of
interest to you.” 146 Clark agreed, thanking Taylor and disclosing that, “Mr. Hogan’s account is
very similar to others that we have received.” 147
Despite the best efforts of the Reagan administration and the evangelical community,
however, congressional opposition to direct military aid to the regime persisted. Although
Reagan and his advisors searched for ways to maneuver around Congress and provide military
assistance without congressional approval, they failed to do so amid news of extrajudicial
killings and the murder of three USAID workers by Guatemalan soldiers. 148 Offering the needed
helicopter parts for cash rather than as a grant emerged as the best option. In early 1983, the
Reagan administration announced its approval of Foreign Military Sales funding to Guatemala
for purchase of helicopter spare parts in recognition of “progress in human rights achieved by
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President Ríos Montt since he came to power.” 149
Citing a lack of money to purchase the needed spare parts, Ríos Montt ignored the offer
and looked to the U.S. evangelical network for more substantive support. 150 Gospel Outreach and
other Christian benefactors provided assistance in acquiring military materiel, including the
elusive spare helicopter parts, from private dealers in the United States as well as from Canada
and Israel. 151 Love Lift International coordinated and funded many of these purchases. 152
U.S. evangelicals also lent direct support to the rural pacification program. Gospel
Outreach and el Verbo members worked alongside the army in establishing the “model villages”
or strategic hamlets in the Guatemalan countryside. 153 Love Lift International played a key role
in this effort, establishing the Fundación Para Ayuda los Pueblos Indígenas to provide funds,
personnel, and administrative support to run the villages. 154 These efforts comported with Ríos
Montt’s earlier boast to “bring hundreds of American Christians down as volunteers to
reconstruct the Quiche, Huehuetenango, San Marcos and other departments as the army begins to
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pacify them.” 155 Assuming churches would raise funds for this effort, some State Department
officials found the strategy promising enough to promote it to others within the U.S.
government. 156
By Rios Montt’s own description, the planned model villages blended military strategy
he learned at the School of the Americas with the “communitarian” Christian values of the
Gospel Outreach church. 157 Although newspaper reports detailed the dismal conditions, as well
as the compulsory conscription of male refugees into civilian armies to fight the guerrillas, U.S.
evangelicals claimed the model villages provided Christian charity, spiritual uplift, and a
bulwark against communism. 158 As one press release noted, “food, shelter, clothing, and
medicine are being provided to those in need; along with Army protection, training of civil patrol
groups, and weapons to defend themselves.” 159
Ultimately, U.S. evangelical oversight of the model villages outlasted Ríos Montt’s
tenure in office. Gospel Outreach and Love Lift International continued their ministrations—with
USAID funds—even after Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores removed Ríos Montt in the August,
1983 coup. 160 The network linking U.S. and Guatemalan evangelicals proved resilient. Although
evangelicals enjoyed a period of particular power and visibility during Ríos Montt’s presidency,
their involvement within and influence on Guatemalan society and politics persisted long after he
stepped down.
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The evangelicalism that helped Ríos Montt gain and hold power in Guatemala in 1982
contributed to the unraveling of his presidency in 1983. Although coup rumours had plagued his
government since he had declared himself president, they became quite real by June 1983. 161
Disgruntled members of the military and major political parties, including original junta member
Gordillo Martínez and a former MLN vice president, complained on television about Ríos
Montt’s “religious fanaticism” and “use of the presidency as a pulpit to promote his evangelical
beliefs.” 162 Brigadier General Echeverría asked Ríos Montt to restore constitutional government
and stop mixing religion with politics. 163 Army leaders expressed frustration about the power
evangelical advisors Bianchi and Contreras exercised within the government. 164 Despite the
simmering unrest, Ríos Montt refused to let his advisors resign. 165
The State and Defense Departments expressed concern about the coup rumblings,
reiterating their approval of Ríos Montt’s counterinsurgency program, progress on human rights,
and political moderation. 166 Defense Department experts estimated that the general could stay in
power only with army backing; without this support, a coup was imminent. 167 On August 8,
1983, disgruntled senior army commanders overthrew Ríos Montt and placed Mejía in power,

Frederic Chapin, United States Embassy, Guatemala to United States Department of State, Washington, “Coup
Rumors,” 24 March 1983, folder “Guatemala, Vol. I, 1/20/81 – 7/31/84 [2 of 5],” Box 52, NSC Executive
Secretariat: Country File, Latin America, Ronald Reagan Library; Memorandum, Alfonso Sapia-Bosch to William
P. Clark, “Guatemala,” 14 July 1983, folder “Guatemala, Vol. I, 1/20/81 – 7/31/84 [5 of 5],” Box 52, NSC
Executive Secretariat: Country File, Latin America, Ronald Reagan Library.
162
Paul D. Taylor, United States Embassy, Guatemala to United States Department of State, Washington,
“Disturbances of June 29: Sitrep 4,” 29 June 1983, Secret Cable 005231, DNSA.
163
Defense Intelligence Agency, “BG Rios Montt, Vulnerable and under Attack,” 14 June 1983, Confidential Cable,
DNSA.
164
Ibid.
165
Paul D. Taylor, United States Embassy, Guatemala to United States Department of State, Washington, “The State
of Government—A Week and a Half after the Crisis Broke into the Open,” 8 July 1983, Confidential Cable 005514,
DNSA.
166
Director of Intelligence, “Guatemala: Prospects for Political Moderation: An Intelligence Assessment,” (August
1983): v, folder “Guatemala – Oliver L. North, NSC Staff (3 of 3),” Box 12, Oliver North Files, Ronald Reagan
Library.
167
Ibid.
161

Lauren Frances Turek 36

stating “that they acted to rid the country of a religious fanatic who has ignored the separation
between church and state.” 168
Defense Department officials had worried that if the army or a right wing political faction
ousted Ríos Montt, the new regime would be as oppressive, corrupt, and abusive as the one he
had replaced in 1982. 169 The State Department expected that, “if he is overthrown, it is likely he
will be replaced by a reactionary government whose repressive actions will play into the hands
of the Marxist guerrillas.” 170 These concerns proved prescient. Soon after Mejía took power,
reports of human rights abuses multiplied. The army returned openly to the practices of the
Lucas regime, utilizing military death squads and political repression to control the
countryside. 171
After the coup, Ríos Montt went into retreat for several weeks with his church elders,
then retired to private life, devoting his time to working at el Verbo. 172 Nonetheless, he retained
an interest in returning to politics. In 1989, he founded a new political party, then served multiple
terms in Guatemala’s Congress and made several attempts to run for president.
Ríos Montt nurtured his contacts with evangelicals in the United States during his years
in and out of office. He attended the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington in 1985, and
maintained a correspondence with Douglas Coe of the Fellowship Foundation. 173 He traveled
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within the United States to raise funds for Love Lift International, speaking at evangelical
churches throughout the country. 174 For these audiences, he emphasized the ongoing threat that
communism posed to Central America, and reiterated his belief that he had made critical
improvements for the people of Guatemala during his time in power. Indeed, he insisted
throughout his 2013 trial for genocide and crimes against humanity that he had not ordered
military violence against the Maya in 1982-1983. The staggering evidence the prosecution
presented at the trial belies these assertions. 175
The support that Ríos Montt garnered from evangelical Christians in the United States
illuminates a great deal about the religious and ideological beliefs that grounded evangelical
understandings of human rights and anti-communism. American evangelicals who visited Ríos
Montt, el Verbo, and their brethren in Guatemala believed these individuals when they asserted
that the guerrillas, not the army, committed the majority of the violence against the Guatemalan
people. They trusted Ríos Montt when he argued that pacifying the countryside and removing the
communist threat would bring justice, peace, and human dignity to poor villagers. These
messages resonated with pre-existing evangelical beliefs about communism as an existential
threat not only to a nation, but to religious faith as well. When Guatemalan evangelicals claimed
that under Ríos Montt, they could proselytize without fear of retaliation from the guerrillas, it
reinforced deeply held hopes that evangelicals might achieve the Great Commission during their
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lifetimes. 176 Had U.S. evangelicals consulted the Mayan and Catholic refugees who fled across
the border into Mexico to escape army violence, they might have heard a different, more realistic
perspective on the situation. Instead, they and the Reagan administration backed Ríos Montt,
aiding and abetting genocidal state violence in the process.
Evangelicals believed religious liberty—the freedom to evangelize—was the core human
right, because they saw salvation as the basis for human freedom and the truest cure for man’s
suffering. When Ríos Montt adopted the distinctive language and leadership style of their
particular form of apocalyptic American Christianity, U.S. evangelicals thought they had found
in the Central American leader the personification of their most deeply cherished objectives.
Support for such a “Brother in Christ” flowed freely in response.
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